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ABSTRACT 
Half of the ten metropolitan areas in the U.S. with the highest traffic fatality rates are in Florida.  Crashes and 
fatalities are reduced through engineering, education and enforcement.  Florida’s road infrastructure (engineering) 
requires a significant investment due to decades of population growth.  This study analyzes the economic incentives 
given to police officers in Florida cities to use traffic citations (enforcement), in the absence of incentives for 
engineering or education to prevent crashes and injuries.  Florida’s high traffic fatality cities and counties are 
analyzed to assess the impact of citations on traffic crashes and automobile insurance premiums. In Florida, police 
pensions in participating cities receive a premium tax on automobile insurance policies written within city limits.  A 
1999 amendment to Florida law requires that increased premium tax collections must fund “extra” police pension 
benefits.  Consequently, city police officers financially benefit when automobile insurance premiums increase from 
increased crash and/or citation rates.  The automobile insurance premium taxes disbursed to Florida city police 
pension funds increased from $42.1 million in 1999 to $61.5 million in 2003.  A chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicates that the growth rate of the premium tax revenues increased significantly following the 1999 amendment (p 
< 0.001). Florida city residents paid 46 percent more ($2.3 billion) for automobile insurance in 2003 than 1999.  
Analysis of Florida’s high traffic fatality cities (Fort Lauderdale Jacksonville, Miami, Orlando, Tampa, and St. 
Petersburg) indicates that automobile insurance premiums per 1000 population substantially increased in each city 
after the “extra” benefits legislation was passed.  Crash rates remained high from 1999 to 2003 and increased in 
three of the six cities. The relationship between traffic citations and crashes was analyzed for Florida’s high traffic 
fatality metropolitan counties (Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas counties).  From 
1997 to 2003, traffic citations increased in five of these six high fatality counties.  However, statistical analysis did 
not identify a relationship with crashes, such that changes in the number of citations written did not have a 
statistical relationship to changes in traffic crashes, i.e., traffic citations did not reduce crash rates. Thus, citations 
increase insurance rates in the absence of reducing crash rates. The amended Florida law creates a conflict of 
interest since police officers financially benefit from increased citations and crashes, and insurance companies 
benefit as well.  The public choice theory of economics is used to explain why special interests can take precedence 
over public interests.  Economic incentives should be realigned to eliminate perverse conflicts of interest and 
reward reductions in traffic crash, injury and fatality rates through effective prevention methods, which include 
roadway infrastructure improvements.    
Florida Public Health Review, 2005; 2: 82-91 
 
Introduction 
In 2003, 3,169 people died in Florida traffic 
crashes.  Florida had 18.6 traffic fatalities per 
100,000 population and 1.71 fatalities per 100 million 
vehicle miles traveled.  National averages were much 
lower at, respectively, 14.7 and 1.48 (National 
Highway Safety and Traffic Administration, 2003).    
Florida has five of the 10 metropolitan areas 
with the highest urban traffic fatality rates in the 
nation.  In 2000 and 2001, the Orlando area (Orange 
County) led the nation with 17.2 traffic fatalities per 
100,000 population.  The Tampa-St. Petersburg area 
(Hillsborough and Pinellas counties) ranked second, 
Palm Beach County third, Jacksonville area (Duval 
County) eighth, and Fort Lauderdale area (Broward 
County) ninth (The Road Information Program, 2001; 
Lush, 2002).  Orange, Hillsborough, Palm Beach, and 
Broward counties had the highest number of alcohol-
related traffic fatalities in Florida (National Highway 
Safety and Traffic Administration, 2003) 
In 2003, Florida had four of the top ten cities 
with highest traffic fatality rates - Orlando, 
Jacksonville, Miami, and Tampa (National Highway 
Safety and Traffic Administration Research and 
Development, 2003).   Further, Florida has five of the 
top ten cities with the highest pedestrian fatality rates.  
Miami and Tampa ranked first and second.  
Clearwater, Ft. Lauderdale, and Orlando ranked 
seventh, eighth and ninth respectively (Shankar, 
2004).    
Florida had a disproportionate percent of 
pedestrian and intersection traffic fatalities in 2003.  
Florida pedestrian fatalities accounted for 16% of all 
traffic fatalities, whereas the national average was 
11%.   Approximately 33% of Florida traffic fatalities 
occurred at intersections, compared to the national 
average of 21%.  Only 17% of Florida fatal crashes 
resulted from speeding in comparison to 31% 
nationally, and 41% were alcohol-related, whereas 
the national rate was 46%.  More than 18% of Florida 
fatalities were attributed to lack of motorcycle helmet 
use (83 fatalities) and lack of safety belt use - 494 
fatalities (National Highway Safety and Traffic 
Administration, 2003).  Florida did not require 
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helmet use or have a primary safety belt law.  The 
latter became effective for persons under 18 on July 
1, 2005.  
Florida’s 268 traffic fatalities among elderly 
drivers were the highest among all states in 2001.  
Florida had a 70% increase in the number of older 
drivers killed in traffic crashes from 1991 to 2001 
whereas the national average increased by 27% (The 
Road Information Program, 2003). 
Traffic crashes and fatalities are reduced 
using a comprehensive approach through 3Es – 
engineering, education and enforcement.  Law 
enforcement officers can engage in prevention, 
education and enforcement.   Research concludes that 
drivers operate more conservatively for some period 
of time after observing a marked police car, so 
deployment of highly visible marked police cars can 
promote more conservative driving.  Officers can 
make traffic stops when drivers violate a traffic law, 
and can then choose to write or not write a citation.  
Some law enforcement agencies use written warning 
systems to track drivers who violate laws but are not 
given citations.  This system allows for educating 
drivers in the absence of fines and insurance 
increases, but also permits identifying repeat 
offenders.  Officers can also write citations when 
traffic law violations occur.  
Some law enforcement personnel believe 
that increasing citations will reduce crash rates.  For 
example, in 2000, Tampa’s police chief and aide 
wrote the following statement: “The best remedy for 
aggressive driving and crash prevention is traffic law 
enforcement.  This is not only the local philosophy, 
but one which is nationwide” (Bennett & Holder, 
2000). Certain types of citations, such as driving 
under the influence and safety belt violations, have 
obvious potential to reduce crashes and/or injuries.   
A second motivation for citations also 
exists. Nationally, some municipalities use traffic 
citations to increase revenues, which they perceive as 
favorable to increasing taxes.  As such, law 
enforcement officers are reported to hide or disguise 
themselves to increase opportunities to write citations 
and target traffic violators (Story, 2004).  Thus, 
citations can serve a public safety and/or revenue 
generation purpose. 
Traffic Citation Economics and “Extra” Police 
Pension Benefits 
Florida’s penalty for most non-criminal 
moving violations, such as running a stop sign, is 
$117.50.  Fines are higher for speeding and school or 
construction zone violations.  A city would collect 
$23.11 of the $117.50 penalty.  Collections are higher 
for the larger fines (Compton, 2004). 
Insurance companies typically request a 
three year driving history when renewing automobile 
insurance.  However they can request a seven year 
history (Consumer Advocate System, 2005).  
Consequently, in addition to fines, a traffic citation 
can result in an automobile insurance surcharge 
(increase) for three to seven years.   
In recent years, automobile insurers have 
developed sophisticated “pricing tools” to determine 
premium prices.  The new tools resulted in higher 
premium prices for drivers and higher profits for 
insurance companies (Oster, 2004).  Insurance 
companies determine premiums by estimating the 
funds needed to pay for claims, administration, and 
profit.  An automobile insurance premium is 
determined by a driver’s age, sex, and marital status, 
as well as the model of cars, accidents, claims, traffic 
citations, and territory.  Territories that have higher 
or lower loss records (claims) will have higher or 
lower premiums accordingly.  Thus, when the local 
crash rate is high, automobile insurance rates for all 
residents are higher regardless of driving history.  In 
addition, policyholders are assigned an underwriting 
category based on the driver’s history of accidents 
and citations, resulting in discounts of 15% and 
mark-ups of 35% to 75% (The Kiplinger Washington 
Editors, Inc, 2003) 
Florida law authorizes participating cities to 
receive a 0.85% premium tax on the gross amount of 
all casualty insurance premiums collected within a 
municipality (Florida Statutes, 2003).  The police 
pension fund receives the automobile insurance tax 
whereas the firefighter’s pension fund receives the 
tax on property insurance.  The police premium tax 
was established in 1953 to encourage the 
development of police retirement funds in Florida 
cities (Florida Department of Management Services, 
2003).  The premium tax that accrues to a city’s 
police pension fund represents 0.85% of total 
automobile insurance policy premiums, such that 
each tax dollar collected represents $117.65 paid for 
insurance by policy holders in the city limits 
(calculated as $1.00 / 0.0085 = $117.65).   
A 1999 amendment to Florida law requires 
that any amount exceeding the premium tax collected 
for the 1997 year must be used to fund “extra 
benefits.”  Extra benefits must be greater than those 
given to general employees and in addition to 
benefits provided prior to the effective date.  A city’s 
police pension fund will collect more premium tax 
revenues from increases in population, claims, and 
citations. 
Reducing Traffic Crashes and Injuries 
Roadway (engineering) infrastructure 
improvements are an important method to reduce 
traffic crash and fatality rates since they reduce the 
probability of driver error.  In the 1950s, strategies to 
reduce traffic crashes in the U.S. emphasized 
reducing driver errors through traffic law 
enforcement and driver education.  This emphasis 
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was replaced by a more pragmatic prevention 
approach that recognized all drivers can make 
mistakes.  Subsequently, traffic fatalities decreased 
by 75% from reducing the probability of driver error 
and injury through improved roadways, safer cars, 
and emergency medical services.  Emphasis was 
placed on what caused the crash or injury rather than 
who caused the crash (Hemenway, 2002).  The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
recognized motor vehicle safety as one of the ten 
great public health achievements of the 20th century 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999).   
Table 1 provides statistics on fatality rate 
reductions from specific road improvements   (The 
Road Information Program, 2004).  In addition, 
certain improvements are recommended to reduce 
hazards for older drivers.   
 




Fatality Rate in 
Percent 
Constructing median for 
traffic separation  73 
Realign roadway 66 
Sight distance 
improvements 56 
New traffic signals 53 
Turning lanes and traffic 
channelization 47 
Widen or improve shoulder 22 
 
Some driving decisions become more difficult for 
older drivers due to deteriorating eyesight, reaction 
time, and cognitive abilities.  This situation indicates 
a need for adding pavement markings and overhead 
indicators for turning lanes, using larger lettering on 
signage, improving lighting, widening lanes, and 
installing longer merge lanes (The Road Information 
Program, 2003). 
 Staff at the Advocates for Highway and 
Auto Safety commented on dangerous roads, as 
follows.  “They have severe curves so that they have 
poor sight distance. They have narrow lanes, and all 
you have to do is just to depart that lane a couple of 
feet and you're into an extremely hostile territory. 
There is no margin for error on those roads."  NBC 
News identified Florida’s highway US-19 as topping 
the list of most dangerous roads, as noted below. 
 
Billy wasn't drunk, wasn't doing anything 
reckless, wasn't doing anything careless. He was 
just walking along the edge of the road. That was 
enough. 
Take one family's grief and multiply it by 100. 
That's how many pedestrians have been hit and 
killed on Florida's US-19 in five years. It's a six-
lane meat grinder running 30 miles up Florida's 
Gulf Coast.  We first visited in 2002, and found 
the shoulders of the road dotted with white 
crosses memorializing the dead. With fatalities 
in triple figures, US-19 is at the top of our list of 
dangerous roads (Dateline NBC, 2005).   
 
US-19 does not have a sidewalk.  It is estimated that 
Florida roads require a $9.5 billion to $23 billion 
investment due to decades of population growth in 
the absence of adequate infrastructure improvements 
(Bousquet, 2005). 
 
Objectives and Methods 
This analysis evaluates the economic 
incentives given to city police departments in Florida 
to use traffic citations and analyzes the effectiveness 
of traffic citations in reducing Florida’s high traffic 
crash and fatality rates, as well as the related impact 
on automobile insurance rates.  The following 
research questions are addressed.  
• Did premium taxes on automobile insurance 
increase at a greater rate once city police 
officers financially benefit from increased 
automobile insurance rates?   
• What relationship exists between crash/citation 
rates and premium tax revenues in Florida’s 
high traffic fatality cities? 
• Did traffic citations increase in Florida’s high 
fatality metropolitan areas?  
• Does a statistical relationship exist between 
changes in the number of traffic citations and 
changes in the number of crashes? 
The final question addresses whether an association 
exists between citations and crashes, i.e., are 
increases in citations associated with a declining 
number of crashes?  
The following sections provide an analysis 
of Florida’s high traffic fatality cities to compare 
growth rates in premium tax levels before and after a 
1999 amendment to Florida law that required the 
funding of “extra” police pension benefits from a tax 
on automobile insurance.  Statistical testing is used to 
compare pre-amendment and post-amendment 
changes in premium tax collections and to assess 
whether changes in traffic citations affected crash and 
fatality rates in Florida’s high traffic fatality urban 
counties.  Statistics on the premium tax and crash and 
fatality rates are available from the Florida 
Departments of Retirement Services and Highway 
Safety and Motor Vehicles.   Two years of 
motorcycle law enforcement crash reports from the 
Tampa area (Hillsborough County) are used to 
analyze the percent of crash investigations that do not 
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result in a citation, comparing law enforcement 
agencies that receive and do not receive extra pension 
benefits from the tax on insurance. 
 
Premium Tax Trends 
Table 2 provides annual statistics (in 
millions) for (a) the premium tax revenues collected 
for all participating Florida cities from 1997 to 2003 
(Florida Department of Retirement Services, 2004), 
(b) the automobile insurance paid by all city residents 
estimated by using the $117.65 multiplier, and (c) the 
amount of “extra” pension benefits that must be 
provided to city police officers.  “Extra” benefits 
were calculated by subtracting the 1997 premium tax 
total of $41.0 million from the premium tax collected 
for each year.  The “extra” benefits amendment was 
passed and became effective in 1999 so extra benefits 
were nonexistent in the 1997 and 1998 years.  
Automobile insurance policy holders in 
Florida cities paid 46% more for insurance in 2003 
than 1999.  The insurance increase from $4.95 billion 
in 1999 to $7.240 billion in 2003 indicates residents 
in Florida cities paid $2.3 billion more for automobile 
insurance in 2003 than 1999.  A chi-square goodness 
of fit test indicates that the growth rate of the 
premium tax revenues increased significantly 
following the 1999 amendment (p < 0.001).  Figure 1 
shows the annual percent growth rate in the premium 
tax collections from 1997 to 2003. 
 
Analysis of Florida’s High Traffic Fatality Cities 
In 2003, Orlando, Jacksonville, Miami, and 
Tampa were listed with top ten traffic fatality rates 
among 150 U.S. cities.  Ft. Lauderdale and St. 
Petersburg also had high fatality rates.  Table 3 
summarizes 2003 statistics for these high traffic 
fatality cities, including the Fatality Rate per 100,000 
Population (National Highway Safety and Traffic 
Administration Research and Development, 2003), 
Crash Rate per 1000 Population, Citations per 1000 
Population, and Adjusted Insurance Rate per Person.  
Crash rates include only major crashes that involved 
an injury, fatality or wrecker to remove the vehicles, 
and exclude minor crashes (Florida Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 2004a).  The 
Citation Rate is calculated using non-criminal 
moving violations that were written by the city police 
department (Florida Department of Highway Safety 
and Motor Vehicles, 2004b).  These citations increase 
insurance rates.  Criminal citations that result in 
arrests, non-moving violations that do not increase 
insurance rates, and citations written by other 
agencies are excluded.  The Adjusted Insurance per 
Person statistic was calculated by multiplying the 
automobile insurance premium tax collections for 
each city by the $117.65 multiplier, and then dividing 
by the city population total, and then dividing by the 
Florida price level index (Florida Statistical Abstract, 
2004) to adjust for differences in cost of living.  
Population statistics were used since the number of 
licensed drivers by city was unavailable.  The six 
citys’ traffic fatality rates of 13.73 to 15.55 per 
100,000 population are significantly higher than other 
U.S. cities, many of which achieve rates of 4 to 8 
fatalities per 100,000 population.   
Insurance rates are primarily influenced by: 
(a) the crash rate, which is a proxy for property and 
injury claims, and (b) the citation rate, which creates 
multi-year insurance increases.  Orlando’s insurance 
rate does not follow this pattern.  However, their 
tourism rate is three to four times higher than the 
other five cities so rental car insurance would 
increase their total premium tax collections.  
Jacksonville is a consolidated municipality so a 
citation rate could not be calculated that is 
comparable to the other cities.    
The two cities with the lowest crash rates, 
Jacksonville and St. Petersburg, had the lowest 
insurance rates.  Citation surcharges are assessed as a 
percent of the premium so lower crash rates result in 
a lower surcharge from a citation.  St. Petersburg also 
had the lowest traffic citation rate. 
Figure 2 provides trends in crashes per 1000 
population from 1999 to 2003 years for Florida’s 
high traffic fatality cities.  Since 1999, crash rates per 
1000 population increased in Miami, St. Petersburg 
and Tampa.  Crash rates per 1000 population 
decreased in Ft. Lauderdale and Orlando. However 
the rates are now similar to ones in Miami.  
Jacksonville’s crash rate increased somewhat through 
2002, and then decreased in 2003.    
Although Tampa had the highest crash rate 
from 2000 to 2003, insurance rates in Miami and Ft. 
Lauderdale were higher, possibly due to their higher 
traffic citation rates.  Whereas Miami and Ft. 
Lauderdale had similar crash rates, Miami’s higher 
insurance rate might reflect the significantly higher 
citation rate. 
Table 4 summarizes the average percent 
annual changes in premium tax revenues from 1996 to 
1999, the pre-amendment period, with the average 
annual change from 2000 to 2003, the time period 
following the amendment (Florida Department of 
Management Services, 2003). The Annual Rate 
Increase per 1000 Population provides the annual 
insurance premium increase (adjusted by city 
population) for the four years prior to the “extra 
benefits” legislation and the four years subsequent to 
the legislation.  Annual automobile insurance premium 
increases were relatively modest from 1996 to 1999, 
and annually averaged 2.5 to 23 times greater in 2000-
2003.  The large premium increases from 2000 to 2003 
reflect insurance company assumptions about each 
city’s increased risk for claims. 
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Table 2.  Premium Taxes, Insurance and "Extra" Benefits for Florida Cities, 
1997 to 2003 (in millions)   
    
Year Premium Tax Collected Insurance Paid "Extra" Benefits  
1997 $41.0 $4,827 $0 
1998 $41.2 $4,849 $0 
1999 $42.1 $4,953 $1.1 
2000 $43.6 $5,129 $2.6 
2001 $48.7 $5,724 $7.6 
2002 $54.6 $6,419 $13.5 















City Per 100,000 Per 1000 Per 1000 Per Person 
Orlando 15.55 26.4 128.8 $1,821 
Jacksonville 15.25 16.1 - $647 
Miami 15.13 25.8 343.5 $1,851 
Tampa 15.11 30.0 152.2 $1,154 
Fort Lauderdale 14.73 25.1 177.8 $1,345 
St. Petersburg 13.73 16.4 96.3 $704 
 
Figure 1.  Percent Growth Rate in Premium Tax Collections








1997 1998 1999 2000 200120022003
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Table 4.  Premium Tax Revenues by City 
Premium Tax Annual Rate Increase  
  (in thousands) Per 1000 Population 
  1996 2003 1996-1999 2000-2003 
Ft. Lauderdale $1,493  $1,984  2.0% 5.3% 
Jacksonville $2,380  $4,135  0.6% 13.7% 
Miami $4,623  $6,320  1.5% 5.6% 
Orlando $2,022  $3,007  3.0% 9.4% 
St. Petersburg $1,057  $1,490  3.4% 13.3% 
Tampa $2,048  $3,090  1.7% 10.3% 
 
 
Table 5.  Traffic Citations by county 
 County  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1997-
2003      
% 
Change 
Ft. Lauderdale area 457,824 478,162 494,168 498,006 467,052 517,543 587,378 28.3% 
Jacksonville area 212,163 198,867 240,444 270,655 289,055 317,113 307,947 45.1% 
Orlando area 219,003 225,579 255,552 244,782 248,484 214,070 185,967 -15.1% 
West Palm Beach area 260,167 253,878 280,250 311,323 320,358 376,252 371,944 43.0% 
St. Petersburg area 128,224 138,084 143,049 147,889 180,482 184,122 180,695 40.9% 
Tampa area 154,030 173,663 183,002 191,017 196,534 213,483 229,982 49.3% 
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Florida’s High Traffic Fatality Metropolitan 
Counties 
Florida’s five areas that are in the top ten 
high traffic fatality metropolitan areas include six 
counties since the Tampa-St. Petersburg metropolitan 
area includes two counties.  Table 5 provides total 
traffic citation trends for the six counties (Florida 
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 
Florida, 2004b).  Five of the six areas increased 
traffic citations since 1997.  The exception was the 
Orlando area.  Statewide, Florida traffic citations 
increased by 27.6% from 1997 to 2003 when 4.3 
million were written. 
To test the assumption that increasing 
citations would decrease crashes, a regression 
analysis was performed to assess the relationship 
between traffic citations and crashes per 100,000 
population from 1997 to 2003 for Florida’s six high 
fatality counties.  The percent change in the number 
of citations written in all counties from the preceding 
year is the independent variable.  The dependent 
variable is the corresponding percent change in 
crashes from all six counties.  The regression test 
results indicate a positive correlation of 0.279 and a 
point estimate of 0.159 (p=0.099).  This point 
suggests the increase in citations did not decrease 
crashes.  Indeed, the correlation suggests increased 
citations as associated with increased crashes. 
This calculation is supported by the county 
trends.  The Orlando area crash rate decreased 
beginning in 2000, when citations began to decrease.  
Similarly, Jacksonville’s crash rate increased from 
1997 to 2002 when citations increased, and the crash 
rate decreased in 2003 when traffic citations 
decreased.  Thus, both Jacksonville and Orlando 
decreased crash rates in time periods of decreasing 
citations, which suggests alternative strategies were 
used.  In contrast, the St. Petersburg area increased 
citations, which was associated with an increased 
crash rate.  The Tampa area (Hillsborough County) 
consistently had the highest traffic crash and fatality 
rates, and had the highest percent increase in 
citations.  The Tampa area crash rate decreased with 
increasing citations from 1997 to 1999.  However, 
the crash rate increased in 2000 and was sustained as 
citations continued to increase through 2003.  
Alternatively, Palm Beach and Ft. Lauderdale areas 
decreased crash rates in time periods of increasing 
citations.  Thus, merely increasing numbers of 
citations does not assure reduced crash rates.  
Unlike city police departments, sheriff’s 
deputies and Florida Highway Patrol troopers do not 
receive benefits from automobile insurance premium 
tax revenues.  In 2003, the city police departments in 
five of the six counties wrote more traffic citations 
than sheriff’s deputies or the Florida Highway Patrol.  
Jacksonville was the exception; however it is a 
consolidated municipality so a distinction between 
the city and county could not be made.  
To test whether city police departments, 
which receive “extra” benefits from premium tax 
revenues, are more likely to write traffic citations 
than those agencies that do not receive premium 
taxes and extra benefits, an analysis was conducted 
regarding the number of citations written by each 
Tampa area (Hillsborough County) law enforcement 
agency in a two year study of helmet use in 
motorcycle crashes from July 1999 through June 
2001.  Florida law permits officers to write a citation 
in a crash investigation if the officer conducts a 
personal investigation and has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe a traffic offense was 
committed (Florida Statutes §316.645 2004).  A crash 
is only reported on the driving record of drivers who 
receive a citation following a crash.  A citation 
related to a crash investigation can trigger two 
separate insurance surcharges, one for the crash and a 
second for the citation.   
The three Hillsborough County police 
departments (Plant City, Tampa, and Temple 
Terrace) did not write citations in 23% of crash 
investigations.  In contrast, sheriff’s deputies and the 
Florida Highway Patrol did not write citations in 57% 
of crash investigations.  The subtotals for the number 
of crash reports with citation(s), crash reports with 
citation(s) pending, and crash reports without 
citations of the two groups were used to compute a 
chi-square statistic.  The statistic of 86.92 is 
statistically significant (p < 0.001).  Thus, law 
enforcement agencies that do not receive premium 
taxes wrote citations in a significantly lesser percent 
of crash investigations than agencies that receive 
premium tax revenues.   
 
Discussion 
The findings do not demonstrate a consistent 
relationship between traffic citations and crash rates.  
This indicates the presence of an alternative 
explanation for the dramatic rise in citations in most 
high fatality areas.  The “extra” pension benefit and 
associated incentives for Florida city police 
departments emphasize traffic citations and is offered 
as an alternative explanation.  Police departments 
directly control the number of traffic citations and 
can systematically increase the number written.  For 
example, Tampa police added a second traffic squad 
in 1999 that is dedicated to writing citations, and then 
doubled the number of citations written by district 
patrol officers the following year.  In 2004, they 
again announced citations were further increased by 
more than 60% in the first months relative to the 
previous year. (Tampa Police Traffic Unit, 2004; 
Wexler & Carlton, 2000; Morelli, 2004). 
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Why would elected officials and public 
administrators create incentives for traffic citations 
and auto insurance increases, while failing to address 
more effective ways to prevent crashes and injuries, 
such as needed roadway infrastructure?   Two 
theories are generally used to explain the decisions of 
elected officials.  Public interest theory suggests that 
legislators enact policies that are designed to promote 
the greater good of society.  Alternatively, special 
interest theory suggests that elected officials and 
public administrators act to promote legislation that 
benefits specific groups, as opposed to the general 
public.  The success of special interest groups to 
affect policy depends on the structure of the group, 
the cost of organization, the resources available to 
that group, and the disposition of potential opposing 
groups.  In this case, the latter consists of drivers, 
which consist of disparate groups without the 
prospect of organization, therefore ruling out the 
possibility of effective monitoring of policies that 
affect them indirectly.  Elected officials and public 
administrators appear to be captured by special 
interests due to their influence. 
 Increasing traffic citations and/or failing to 
reduce crash rates ultimately require individuals to 
spend more on automobile insurance. The 1999 
amendment benefits automobile insurance companies 
by creating a financial incentive for police officers to 
write more traffic citations, which increases revenues 
in the absence of additional insurance company 
expense.  The public choice theory of special interest 
suggests that the benefits that accrue to specific 
groups (automobile insurance companies and police 
departments and unions) take precedent over the 
general public’s interests. 
Insurance industry interests were further 
advanced in 2005 Florida legislation that increased 
driving record points from three to four points for red 
light running citations.  The fine for a red light 
running citation was increased to provide funding for 
trauma centers, in addition to the additional point on 
the driving record that can create a higher insurance 
increase. The legislative analysis identified the 
impact to the private sector as “four points assessed 
on the driving record, which could result in ….higher 
insurance premiums” (Florida House of 
Representative Staff Analysis, 2005). The legislative 
analysis did not forecast reductions in crashes or 
injuries.  Red light running is an odd focus for two 
reasons.  First, five contributing causes account for 
90% of Florida’s traffic fatalities in 2003.  The five 
did not include traffic signal violations (red light 
running).  Second, red light running is best controlled 
by increasing the length of yellow light timings.  A 
spokesperson for the National Motorists Association 
reported that many red-light violations are caused by 
engineering problems, such as overly short yellow-
light times.  However, it was noted that some local 
governments do not change settings since they do not 
want to lose the citation revenue.  San Diego had to 
cancel 5,000 red light running citations from red-light 
cameras (cameras that photograph drivers and their 
license plates and send the citation by mail) that were 
improperly installed, with shortened yellow lights 
(Editorial, St. Petersburg Times, 2001). The District 
of Columbia collected $85 million in the first year 
following installation of its red-light cameras (Story, 
2004).   
Consistent with special interest theory, 
which asserts that groups that are costly to organize 
and inform, Florida voters do not appear to attribute 
their high crash and fatality rates or rising automobile 
insurance rates to decisions made by elected and/or 
law enforcement officials.  Likewise, voters do not 
appear to hold elected officials accountable for 
failures to improve roads and reduce congestion and 
high traffic crash and fatality rates.  Instead, voters 
often appear to believe that more traffic citations are 
an effective remedy, thereby assisting to advance 
special interests.  In fact, policymakers may be 
misinformed about the means to reduce traffic 
crashes and injuries, due to the influence of special 
interest groups.   
 
Conclusions 
The quantitative and qualitative analyses of 
the high fatality rate communities conclude that a 
relationship does not exist between traffic citations 
and crashes.  However, economic incentives to 
Florida municipalities create overemphasis on traffic 
citations.  This emphasis is inconsistent with public 
health research, recommendations from the 
transportation sector, and quality improvement 
principles.  Municipalities should systematically 
analyze the root cause of crashes and resolve high 
crash and high traffic fatality locations through 
indicated infrastructure improvements and alternative 
law enforcement techniques, such as using police 
cars as pace cars to prevent speeding and remaining 
highly visible to promote safe driving.    
The current economic incentives are 
perverse since high crash, claim and citation rates 
increase “extra” police pension benefits.  
Policymakers should eliminate this incentive and 
support initiatives that reward municipalities for 
adopting effective traffic safety strategies to prevent 
crashes and injuries.  The public choice theory 
concludes that elected officials will respond to voter 
concerns in order to maintain elected positions.  The 
challenge for public health advocates and the general 
public is to organize efforts that advance effective 
practices to direct resources toward reducing 
Florida’s high traffic crash and fatality rates.   
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Further research is indicated to analyze root 
causes of Florida crashes and identify opportunities 
to reduce crashes and injuries.  The need for further 
research is implied to determine whether law 
enforcement practices to disguise or use unmarked 
vehicles, which do not impact driver behavior similar 
to marked vehicles, is effective in reducing crash 
rates.  Finally, research is indicated on whether the 
one point increase in red light running violations 
results in police departments increasing the number 
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